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1. INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays, international commercial arbitration is widely considered as an effective alternative 
of state court jurisdiction, it has become an essential feature of today’s globalized economy. The 
more popular and widespread international commercial arbitration gets, the more urgently the 
question rises: what kind of relationship is there between arbitration and the activity of state 
courts? Has arbitration been acknowledged as a totally separate institution with is own methods 
and devices or is it subsidiary to state courts in the meaning of the word that the latter might 
have some effect on it? 
 
Before answering these questions, let us examine the theoretical basis and necessity of 
arbitration. The first factor is that the legal culture of a certain country affects the possibility of 
institutionalizing arbitration. Furthermore, it is also one of the logical consequences of party 
autonomy and freedom of contracting, i.e. if a party obliges himself through private law 
contracts, he also has the right to enforce performance of the contract by arbitration and not 
being obliged to turn to state courts. This is required by the idea of constitutional state, too, 
which implies that in the 21st century, exclusivity of state court jurisdiction is not appropriate 
because special needs of special sectors must be taken into account as well. The interests of the 
parties are best fulfilled if there are several ways of dispute resolution besides just state courts.  
 
The necessity of arbitration lies in the following factors. First, inflexible and not easily 
modifiable procedural rules of state court jurisdiction do not harmonize with the interests of 
the parties who would prefer freer, quicker and more effective procedure and a decision serving 
their interests at the most. Another factor deriving from strict procedural rules of state court 
jurisdiction is that the procedure is public which might be disadvantageous and awkward for 
the parties who would prefer not to ‘publicize’ their confidential business-related affairs. 
Similarly disadvantageous may be the course of judicial control of court decisions. On one 
hand it might be preferable because it allows of avoiding incorrect decisions but on the other 
hand, it can unreasonably prolong the procedure and raises its costs. This is not very useful in a 
dynamically changing economy. Turning to a broader aspect, in international legal disputes, a 
party may be afraid of foreign procedural rules, i.e. those of the state court making the 
decision2.  
 
Institutionalization of arbitration has several consequences. Firstly, obligations of the 
constitutional state will not be shared between state jurisdiction and arbitration: safeguarding 
legality of dispute resolution and excluding arbitrariness will be a common and mutual 
obligation of the two institutions. Therefore, state jurisdiction and arbitration are becoming 
equal and co-operative entities. State jurisdiction stands by arbitration without interfering into 
it unnecessarily. Requesting the help of state courts is not compulsory but a possibility.  
 
Arbitration is a separate legal institution with its own advantages which are the following: 
- The procedure is quicker, therefore, it does not interfere into the normal course of 
business for a longer time which might reduce the costs as well. 
- The procedure is not public, thus, the concerned companies etc. do not have to fear for 
being forced ‘to wash their dirty linen in public’. 
                                                 
2 Prof. Dr. Günther Hirsch: Schiedsgerichte – ein Offenbarungseid für die staatlichen Gerichte?, SchiedsVZ Zeitschrift für 
Schiedsverfahren 2/2003, p. 49-50. 
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- Arbitrators have special skills and knowledge possession of which could not be expected 
from state court judges dealing with so many different cases and issues. Thus the parties 
may feel the procedure more convenient and favourable, being aware of the fact that the 
judges making the decision are experts of the field concerned. 
- Coming to the closing point of a procedure, another advantage of arbitration is that the 
decision is utter and it can be enforced immediately (with special exceptions of course) 
by related international conventions. 
 
The issue of the relationship between arbitration and state court jurisdiction arises at this point 
of the analysis. Regarding the status of the two institutions within the system of dispute 
resolution, state jurisdiction is situated at one end of an imaginary line of process, while 
arbitration, as an alternative of state jurisdiction, can be placed somewhere in the middle 
between state jurisdiction and ‘self-help’ which is situated at the other end of the imaginary 
line. The ideal relationship between arbitration and state jurisdiction would be a 
complementary one where both institutions would add something to the other one according 
to the interests and requests of the parties. 
 
State courts have two main functions concerning arbitration: firstly, they ‘roll over’ the 
arbitration process if it is stuck (e.g. they nominate an arbitrator if one of the parties failed to 
do it, or play an important role in determining the scope of arbitral jurisdiction); secondly, they 
have control over arbitration to some extent (e.g. when setting aside an award by the arbitral 
tribunal).  
 
This article will examine the relationship between state court jurisdiction and arbitration 
according to the UNCITRAL Model Law (hereinafter: MAL), German and Hungarian law. 
Before the thorough analysis, these sources of law will be introduced briefly. The MAL, 
accepted on 21 June 19853 and adopted by 42 countries so far4, creates the foundations for the 
unification of the rules of arbitration by consolidating advantageous characteristics of 
regulations and international experience so far and by comprehending requirements in order to 
make arbitration more effective. Therefore, the MAL is eligible for implementation into 
domestic laws and for winding up ‘double regulation’ by national and international provisions. 
The MAL is being revised continuously by UNCITRAL Working Group II. (International 
arbitration and conciliation) which plays an important part in specification, actualization and 
unification of international commercial arbitration regulations. Both examined countries have 
adopted the MAL with slight individual differences which will be introduced in this study. The 
German regulation can be found in Book 10 (Zehntes Buch) of the ZPO (German Code of 
Civil Procedure) from Art. 1025 to 1048. Hungary, on the contrary, has a separate source of law 
on arbitration, i.e. ‘Act of the Parliament No. 71 of 1994 on Arbitration’ (‘1994. évi LXXI. 
törvény a választottbíráskodásról’).  
 
 
                                                 
3 By UNCITRAL decision no. 40/72 and confirmed by the UN General Assembly. 
4 Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, 
Lithuania, Macau Special Administrative Region of China, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, 
Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Ukraine, within the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Scotland; within the United States of America: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon 
and Texas; Zambia, and Zimbabwe (status of 26 September 2003, source: http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm) 
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2. MEANS OF STATE COURT INTERVENTION INTO ARBITRATION – IN 
GENERAL 
 
The MAL recognizes state court intervention into arbitration in nine main cases, which are: 
 
1. the substantive claim is brought before a state court (Art. 8.) 
2. awardable interim measures by a state court (Art. 9.) 
3. appointment of arbitrators (Art. 11.) 
4. challenge procedure (Art. 13.) 
5. termination of the arbitrator’s mandate (Art. 14.) 
6. jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (Art. 16.) 
7. court assistance in taking evidence (Art. 27.) 
8. setting aside an arbitral award (Art. 34.) 
9. recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award (Art. 35-36.) 
 
These cases can be divided into two groups. 
 
The first one includes cases in connection with appointment, challenge and termination of the 
mandate of an arbitrator (Art. 11, 13, 14.), jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (Art. 16.) and 
setting aside an arbitral award (Art. 34.). The latter cases are referred to in Art. 6 MAL as 
functions which shall be borne by the court or other authority (e.g. chamber of commerce etc.) 
designated by each State. This designation does not mean that only one court or other 
authority would have the right to deal with these cases, instead, assigning certain types of courts 
or authorities would be preferable. Therefore, the wording of the MAL should not be 
interpreted too narrowly. Thus, designating a whole court or one of its chambers is not 
necessary either, assigning the task to the chairman of a court or a tribunal would suffice as 
well, since there are only administrative questions to decide on. The MAL allows for the 
designation of other outsider authorities e.g. international arbitration commission, institution 
or other institute dealing with international affairs. However, the two examined national laws 
stick to the ‘traditional’ solution: the ZPO5 gives this power to the Oberlandesgericht (Provincial 
Court of Appeal) distinguishing several cases, and the Hungarian Arbitration Act6 designated 
the county court which makes the decision in non-litigation process7.  
 
The remaining functions, i.e. court assistance in taking evidence (Art. 27.) recognition of the 
arbitration agreement, including its compatibility with court-ordered interim measures of 
protection (articles 8 and 9), and recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (articles 35 
and 36).  
 
After all, what does state court intervention mean? The Explanatory Note to the MAL8 explains 
that the current tendency is to urge limitation of state court intervention. Art. 5 MAL provides 
that “/i/n matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in 
this Law”. This rule, however, does not answer the question what exact role state courts have 
                                                 
5 ZPO Art. 1062. 
6 Art. 51. An exception is the ordering of interim measures which is the obligation of the municipal court on the territory of 
which taking evidence can be carried out the most effectively. (Art. 37) 
7 Except for the proceedings on setting aside an arbitral award. There is no remedy against the decision. (Art. 53)  
8 www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm 
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but it “guarantees the reader and user that he will find all instances of possible court 
intervention in this Law, except for matters not regulated by it (e.g., consolidation of arbitral 
proceedings, contractual relationship between arbitrators and parties or arbitral institutions, or 
fixing of costs and fees, including deposits)”9.  
 
In the following chapters, the means of intervention provided for in the MAL, the ZPO and the 
Hungarian Arbitration Act will be presented and compared, and practical cases will be analysed.  
 
 
3. ARBITRATION AND SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM BEFORE COURT (ART. 8 MAL) 
According to Art. 8 MAL, a court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the 
subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not later than when submitting 
his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds 
that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. By such an 
action, arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may 
be made, while the issue is pending before the court. Art. II (3) of the New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter: the New York 
Convention) sets out nearly the same criteria but Art. 8 MAL refers to each and every court of a 
state and it is not restricted to arbitration agreements where the place of arbitration is in the 
same country where the court is. Art.8 MAL is imperative, therefore, a certain legal dispute 
must be referred to arbitration unless the exceptions apply. Thus, the possibility of referring a 
case to arbitration is a negative consequence of the arbitration agreement because the disputes 
are always resolved by arbitration regardless of whether or not the arbitration clause contains 
the exclusion of state courts.  
 
Now, let us examine the national laws. The ZPO10 contains exactly the same provision apart 
from two differences. While the MAL designates ‘submitting his first statement on the 
substance of the dispute’ as deadline, the German law provides for ‘the first oral hearing’. The 
other difference concerns the role of state courts by saying that prior to the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, an application may be made to the court to determine whether or not 
arbitration is admissible11.  
 
The Hungarian Arbitration Act is a bit different because here, the court before which an action 
was brought in a case which is the subject of the arbitration agreement, must dismiss the claim 
without issuing a warrant or terminates the proceedings on the request of any party except 
when the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable 
of being performed12. In the latter case, a party must request termination before the submission 
of the counterclaim, and legal effects of the claim remain in force until 30 days13. The 
difference compared to the MAL is that, in the latter cases, it refers the dispute to arbitration. 
Yet, the Hungarian Act is not against arbitration either, whatsoever it repeats the wording of 
the Mal by stating that arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and 
an award may be made, while the issue is pending before the court14.  
                                                 
9 MAL Explanatory Note, B. 1. b) 16. 
10 ZPO Art. 1032. 
11 ZPO Art. 1032 (2) 
12 Art. 8 (1) 
13 Art. 8 (1), (2) 
14 Art. 8 (3) 
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Practical cases show that interpretation of Art. 8 MAL is not always unanimous. Several courts 
have stood for narrow interpretation and exceptionality15, while in the Nanisivik I. case16 the 
court explained that referring the case to arbitration is compulsory if the requirements of Art. 8 
MAL have been fulfilled, and so is the termination of the state court proceedings even if some 
issues are not subject to arbitration. This latter rule was refined in Traff et al. v. Evancic et al17. 
where the court ruled that the state court proceedings must be terminated if any aspect of the 
dispute must be resolved by arbitration. The contrary point of view, presence of ‘residual 
jurisdiction’ of the state courts was stressed in another case18 which contends that the court may 
refuse to refer the dispute to arbitration if it finds that one of the parties named in the 
proceedings is not a party to the arbitration agreement, the dispute is not subject to the 
arbitration agreement, or if the application came too late.  
 
An important feature of a substantive claim before court is the significance of deadline. 
Deadline according to the MAL is ‘submitting his first statement on the substance of the 
dispute’, i.e. ‘entry of appearance’. The consequence of missing the deadline is that the state 
court proceedings cannot be stayed and the dispute cannot be referred to arbitration. The 
Working Group drafting the MAL originally intended to include in the provision that “the 
failure of the party should have a wider effect precluding that party from relying on the 
arbitration agreement also in other contexts and proceedings”19. In the end, these lines were 
not incorporated into the text because they could not find a sufficiently general wording which 
applies to all aspects of the question. Nevertheless, we can contend in general that the aim of 
the provision on pursuing arbitral proceedings is to preclude dilatory tactics by the parties.  
 
Relevant practical cases prove that keeping the deadline is a key issue. The question is how to 
interpret the ‘entry of appearance’. The easiest issue is if the defendant participates in the 
litigation process from its commencement. The British Columbia Supreme Court20 qualified 
this as the defendant’s approval of state court proceedings and did not refer the case to 
arbitration. The Ontario Court of Justice stressed that the requests of staying the state court 
proceedings is late if it is submitted along with the counterclaim.  The right procedure is, the 
court stated, to apply for the stay after receiving the statement of claim but before submitting a 
statement of defence21. Similar decisions were made when the court stated that there was no 
dispute to be referred to arbitration if the defendant had admitted the claim as to liability and 
quantum22. However, admission of liability can be a difficult question on its own. For example, 
in the Zhan Jiang E & T Dev Area Service Head Co. V. An Hau Company Limited case23, the court 
explained that admission of liability in a letter and offering compensation does not constitute 
unequivocal admission of liability. Nevertheless, a decision contrary to the few above was made 
in A. Bianchi S.R.L. v. Bilumen Lighting Ltd. where the court explained that “the delay in invoking 
                                                 
15 Navionics v. Flota Maritima Mexicana S.A. et al - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout015.htm 
16 Nanisivik Mines Ltd. And Zinc Corporation of America v. Canarctic Shipping Co. Ltd. -  
http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout070.htm 
 
17 http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout180.htm 
18 Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Ltd. - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout031.htm 
19 A/CN.9/246, 22.  
20 Queensland Sugar Corp. v. „Hanjin Jedda” (The) -  http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout181.htm 
21 ABN Amro Bank Canada v. Krupp Mak Maschinenbau GmbH - Mealey’s International Arbitration Report, May 1995, p. 11. 
22 Joong and Shipping Co. Limited v. Choi Chong-sick (alias Choi Chong-sik) and Chu Ghin Ho Trading as Chang Ho 
Company -  http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout063.htm 
23 http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout061.htm 
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the arbitration clause and the step undertaken in the judicial proceedings did not amount the 
renunciation of the arbitral procedure (…) and mandatory nature of the provision and the 
absence of judicial discretion required that the parties be referred to arbitration”24.  
 
Besides keeping to the time-limits, subject-matter issues play also an important role in admitting 
a case to be referred to arbitration. The High Court of Hong Kong favoured the validation of 
the parties’ rights at the highest level possible, and laid down that if the parties express their 
intention to arbitrate, the dispute can be referred to arbitration even if an unspecified third 
country, a non-existent organization or non-existent rules were contained in the arbitration 
agreement25. The situation gets a bit more complicated if the parties do intend to arbitrate but 
somehow their agreement contains an arbitration and a state court clause at the same time. In 
such a case the court ruled that arbitration is not excluded even if there is a provision of 
referring legal disputes to a state court, whatsoever, this question must be decided upon by the 
arbitral tribunal since the arbitral tribunal decides on its own jurisdiction (Kompetenz-
Kompetenz)26.  
 
Another court decision concerns the scope of referring a case to arbitration. Accordingly, if one 
defendant requests stay of the state proceedings and reference to arbitration, a concessive court 
decision does not extend to other co-defendants27. A further important subject-matter aspect 
may be the personality of the arbitrator. No doubt that the state court did not refer the dispute 
to arbitration when it found out that doing so would lead to the awkward situation that one of 
the contracting parties would have been an arbitrator, because in doing so, spirit of arbitration 
and the principle of impartiality would have been harmed28.  
 
 
4. INTERIM MEASURES BY A STATE COURT (ART. 9 MAL) 
The possibility of ordering interim measures amounts to an important exception from the 
general principle that state court cannot interfere into arbitration proceedings. It is also 
supported by the fact that, all in all, it is not contrary to the parties’ intentions and does not 
stay arbitral proceedings, whatsoever, ordering interim measures fosters the efficiency of 
arbitration and the expected results.  
 
Art. 9 MAL, Art. 1033 ZPO and Art. 37. (1), (2) of the Hungarian Arbitration Act provide for 
the criteria of ordering interim measures by a state court. “It is not incompatible with an 
arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court 
an interim measure of protection and for a court to grant such measure.” (MAL). The wording 
‘not incompatible’ should mean that requesting interim measures is not incompatible with the 
arbitration agreement, it is neither prohibited, nor to be regarded as a waiver of defence. The 
provision applies to any country to the court of which the request is made, it may not be treated 
as an objection against or disregard of a valid arbitration agreement. This argumentation was 
                                                 
24 http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout186.htm 
 
25 Lucky-Goldstar International (H.K.) Limited v. Ng Moo Kee Engineering - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout057.htm 
26 Mind Star Toys Inc. v. Samsung Co. Ltd - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout032.htm; Rio Algom Limited v. Sammi Steel 
Co. - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout018.htm 
27 Stancroft Trust Limited, Berry and Klausner v. Can-Asia Capital Company, Limited, Mandarin Capital Corporation and 
Asiamerica Capital Limited - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout017.htm 
28 Charbonneau v. Les Industries A.C. Davie Inc et al - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout066.htm 
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followed in a court decision29 when stressing that “interim court orders designed to protect the 
applicant from the risk of being unable to enforce a final arbitral award were not incompatible 
with arbitration”, furthermore, staying the proceeding would not set aside the interim measure 
because the original claim does not merge into the arbitration award.  
 
What do national laws provide for the issue of interim measures? ZPO30 uses the expression 
‘preliminary interim measures of protection’ which should be related to the subject of 
arbitration. The Hungarian law31 deals with measures of protection separately which can be 
ordered if the party requesting it proves existence, quantum and expiry of the claim with an 
official document or a private document representing conclusive evidence. The certification by 
the domestic arbitral tribunal proving that arbitration process has been commenced must be 
submitted along with the request.  
 
Practical cases point to the core of ordering interim measures. The most important questions 
are: what can be regarded as an interim measure and under what circumstances can a court 
order them?  
 
Answering the first question, two examples must be cited. In one case the court decided that a 
Mareva injunction falls under the scope of Art. 9 MAL since the protection afforded by it is 
capable of reducing in the risk of the amount of the claim32. Yet, in Vibroflotation A.G. v. Express 
Builders Co. Ltd.33 the court found that issuing a subpoena duces tecum does not fall under the 
scope of Art. 9 MAL but Art. 27 MAL applies to it.  
 
A very general answer was given to the question on the circumstances of ordering an interim 
measure in Delphi Petroleum Inc. v. Derin Shipping and Training Ltd.34 where the court explained 
that a court jurisdiction to order interim measures according to Art. 9 MAL but it should avoid 
taking measures conductive to dilatory tactics of the parties.  
  
As practical cases have shown as well, Art. 9 MAL is closely related to Art. 27 MAL, problems 
of interpretation and delimitation might occur. The latter provision will be examined later with 
regard to these problems. 
 
 
5. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS (ART. 11 MAL) 
The main rule in appointing arbitrators is the most entire freedom possible in determining the 
procedure of appointing their arbitrators35. This is only restricted by means which can be used 
if the parties did not make such an agreement or if any of them acted contrary to it.  
 
According to the examined legal sources, two main spheres must be introduced: the situation if 
the parties did not agree on the appointment of the arbitrators at all, and if there is such an 
agreement but it is not fulfilled accordingly. Looking at the first issue, the MAL, the ZPO and 
                                                 
29 Trade Fortune Inc. v. Amalgamated Mill Supplies Ltd. -  http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout071.htm 
30 ZPO Art. 1033.  
31 Art. 37. (1), (2) 
32 Katran Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kenven Transportation Ltd. -  http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout039.htm 
33 http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout077.htm 
34 http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout068.htm 
35 Art. 11 (2) MAL, ZPO Art. 1035 (1), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 14. (1). 
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the Hungarian Arbitration Act are unanimous in the question that failing such an agreement, 
in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two 
arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator. If a party fails to appoint the 
arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two 
arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days of their appointment, the 
appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the court or other authority specified in 
accordance with article 636, and the same applies in cases with a sole arbitrator.37  
 
The second issue is also the same in all three legal sources. This affects the situation when the 
agreement on the procedure of appointing the arbitrators is not fulfilled accordingly. The 
concordant provisions contain that in such a case a party fails to act as required under such 
procedure, or the parties, or two arbitrators, are unable to reach an agreement expected of them 
under such procedure, or a third party, including an institution, fails to perform any function 
entrusted to it under such procedure, any party may request the court or other authority 
specified in accordance with article 6 to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on 
the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment38. These 
provisions are aimed at ensuring continuity of the procedure and avoiding dilatory tactics of the 
parties39. Therefore, the right to ask for state court assistance cannot be waived either.  
 
After having clarified the procedure of appointing arbitrators, the question rises what factors 
the court should consider by the appointment. All three legal sources are unified in the opinion 
that regard must be taken to any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of 
the parties and to such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an 
independent and impartial arbitrator and, in the case of a sole or third arbitrator, shall take 
into account as well the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than those 
of the parties40. This provision was emphasized and refined by the High Court of Hong Kong 
when explaining that when appointing an arbitrator on behalf of the party in default, the court 
is obliged to ensure that no sense of grievance is felt, however unreasonable that attitude  might 
appear to others41.  
 
The two examined national laws govern the question more or less the same but there are slight 
differences. The MAL provides that a court decision on appointing an arbitrator shall be 
subject to no appeal42 and the MAL Commentary also lays down that the decision is final43. 
This rule is not followed by either national laws44.  
 
 
 
                                                 
36 In Germany the Oberlandesgericht (ZPO Art. 1062), in Hungary the county court (Art. 53); cf. Supra 6. 
37 Art. 11 (3) MAL, ZPO Art. 1035 (3), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 14. (2)-(4). 
 
38 Art. 11 (4) MAL, ZPO Art. 1035 (4), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 15.  
39 A relevant case is Safond Shipping Sdn. Bhd. V. East Asia Sawmill Corp. - (http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout060.htm) where 
the court found that it is contrary to the spirit of arbitration, constitutes a breach of the obligation to arbitrate and 
unacceptable defiance to the court proceedings if the party in default, will not, on the order of the court, appoint his arbitrator. 
40 Art. 11. (5) MAL, ZPO Art. 1035. (5), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 16. 
41 Fung Sang Trading Limited v. Kai Sun Sea Products and Food Company Limited - in: Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
XVII, Deventer, Netherlands, Kluwer, 1992, p. 289-303. 
42 Art. 11 (5) MAL  
43 Analytical commentary on draft text of model law on international commercial arbitration: report of the Secretary-General 
(A/CN.9/264) 
44  ZPO Art. 1035, Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 11-17. 
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6. CHALLENGE PROCEDURE (ART. 13 MAL) 
Similarly to the appointment of arbitrators, parties are free to agree on the challenge procedure 
as well45. Next, the structure of the provision follows that of the appointment of arbitrators by 
saying that failing such agreement, a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within 
fifteen days (ZPO: two weeks) after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal 
or after becoming aware of any ground for challenge, send a written statement of the reasons 
for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. Unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws from his 
office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the 
challenge.46  
 
The next provision is shared by all three regulations concerning the fact that if a challenge 
under any procedure agreed upon by the parties or under the request of challenge is not 
successful, the challenging party may request, within thirty days (in the wording of the ZPO: 
‘one month’ but the parties can agree on a different time-limit as well) after having received 
notice of the decision rejecting the challenge, the court or other authority to decide on the 
challenge; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal, including the challenged 
arbitrator, may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award47.  
 
The right to turn to state courts in deciding upon the challenge cannot be waived – not even is 
cases where the forum provided for in Art. 6 MAL is an ‘other authority’. Also, it is a 
“compromise solution with regard to the controversy of whether any resort to a court should be 
allowed only after the final award is made or whether a decision during the arbitral proceedings 
is preferable. Thus, advantageous features of both apply because it prevents dilatory tactics, 
removes the challenged arbitrator in time and saves time and costs as well. The important 
requirement of quick procedure in arbitration is not violated either, since the court can 
interfere during the course of the arbitral proceedings, there is a strict deadline for the party to 
make the request, and the court makes a final decision. Therefore, principles of arbitration are 
not harmed even if in the end the court finds that the challenge was unfounded. 
 
 
7. TERMINATION OF THE ARBITRATOR’S MANDATE (ART. 14 MAL) 
 The three legal sources48 are unanimous in providing for the termination of the arbitrator’s 
mandate except for the order of the rules which is different in the Hungarian Arbitration Act. 
All of them lay down that if an arbitrator becomes de iure or de facto unable to perform his 
functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay, his mandate terminates if he 
withdraws from his office or if the parties agree on the termination. Otherwise, if a controversy 
remains concerning any of these grounds, any party may request the court or other authority to 
decide on the termination of the mandate. This decision shall be subject to no appeal according 
to the MAL, but the ZPO and the Hungarian Arbitration Act do not contain such a provision. 
Furthermore, if an arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the termination of 
the mandate of an arbitrator, this does not imply acceptance of the validity of any ground for 
challenge. The three sources of law use different expressions in determining the reason for the 
                                                 
45 Art. 13 (1) MAL, ZPO Art. 1037 (1), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 19 (1).  
46 Art. 13 (2) MAL, ZPO Art. 1037 (2), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 19 (2). 
47 Art. 13 (3) MAL, ZPO Art. 1037 (3), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 20. The MAL does but the two national laws do not 
contain that such a decision by the court is subject to no appeal. 
48 Art. 14 MAL, ZPO Art. 1038, Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 21-22. 
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termination of the mandate. The MAL and the ZPO include “an arbitrator becomes de iure or 
de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay 
an arbitrator becomes de iure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons 
fails to act without undue delay”, while the Hungarian law mentions “an arbitrator does not 
meet the requirements of challenge because a change that occurred after the arbitrator accepted 
the nomination, or the arbitrator became de facto unable to perform his duty”. The 
Explanatory Note states that the most flexible word of broadest meaning is ‘failure’, and 
determines which factors should be taken into account in determining whether the arbitrator 
committed such a failure. These are e.g. what the arbitrator was obliged to under the arbitration 
agreement; if the arbitrator did not act at all, did he cause undue delay in the exact 
circumstances and did it constitute a ‘failure’; how can the failure be evaluated in the light of 
efficiency of the arbitrator’s work and his abilities?49  
 
In practice, the most common cases of court (‘other authority’) intervention are in connection 
with acting in undue delay, significantly less cases concern the issue of becoming unable to 
perform the functions. In addition, Art. 15 MAL50 provides some more reasons for terminating 
an arbitrator’s mandate and in those cases a substitute arbitrator is appointed. These reasons 
are withdrawal from the office for any other reason or revocation of the arbitrator’s mandate by 
agreement of the parties or ’any other case’.  
 
 
8. JURISDICTION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (ART. 16 MAL) 
Before analysing the relevant provisions of the MAL, the ZPO51 and the Hungarian Arbitration 
Act52 regard has to be paid to a terminological issue. While the MAL speaks about ‘jurisdiction’, 
the ZPO uses the word ‘Zuständigkeit’ and the Hungarian Act ‘hatáskör’. The latter two are not 
unambiguous equivalent to ‘jurisdiction’, they rather extend to ‘scope authority’ which comes 
into question only a positive decision was made concerning jurisdiction which means in those 
legal systems that that particular country has the right to deal with the case. However, the word 
‘jurisdiction’ will be used with regard to the latter statement but assuming that they have the 
same meaning concerning these provisions.  
 
According to the MAL, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction53, including any 
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement (Kompetenz-
Kompetenz). For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be 
treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the 
arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso iure the invalidity of the 
                                                 
49 Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,  
www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm. 
50 The same as ZPO Art. 1039 and Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 23. 
51 ZPO Art. 1040. 
52 Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 24-25. 
53 This means that it is the arbitral tribunal that shall decide on its own jurisdiction first and foremost. The court referred to 
this finding in Fung Sang Trading Limited v. Kai Sun Sea Products and Food Company Limited (cf. Supra 40) where the plaintiff 
turned to the court to appoint an arbitrator. The court decided that in doing so, it may not deal with the question whether 
there was a valid arbitration agreement between the parties, because its first duty is to decide upon its own jurisdiction. 
Consequently, it held that the decision of the arbitral tribunal was neither final nor exclusive but subject to immediate review 
under Art. 16 (3) MAL. The same opinion was shared by the Supreme Court of Bermuda in Skandia International Insurance 
Company and Mercantile & General Reinsurance Company and various others where it found that a challenge to the existence, validity 
and scope of the arbitration agreement was a matter to be first determined by the arbitral tribunal under Art. 16 (3) 
MAL.(http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout127.htm) 
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arbitration clause (separability)54. A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction 
shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. A party is not 
precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the 
appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its 
authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is 
raised during the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later 
plea if it considers the delay justified55. The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea the arbitral 
tribunal does not have jurisdiction either as a preliminary question or in an award on the 
merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party 
may request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in 
article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request 
is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award56. 
The ZPO and the Hungarian Arbitration Act literally follow these rules except that they do not 
provide for the fact that the decision shall be subject to no appeal, however, Art. 53 of the 
Hungarian Act includes a general provision that “the court – except for the procedure of setting 
aside an arbitral award – conducts non-litigation process without the cooperation of lay 
assessors. The decision shall be subject to no appeal”. Another difference to the wording of the 
MAL is that the ZPO uses a time limit of ‘one month’ instead of ‘thirty days’.  
 
According to Art. 16 MAL, decision of the arbitral tribunal concerning its own jurisdiction is 
subject to court control57. If jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal was decided upon in the award 
on the merits, the objecting party may initiate court control by requesting setting aside of the 
award. The situation is the same if the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal was decided upon as 
a preliminary question because dilatory tactics of the parties shall be prevented. Three 
protection mechanisms were included into the proceedings: short time-limit of thirty days, 
exclusion of appeal and that arbitral proceedings can be continued in between.  The 
disadvantage of the solution is, however, that lengthy proceedings and taking evidence may lead 
to considerable waste of time and money. Advantages and disadvantages are hard to weigh at a 
general level, therefore, in exact cases, discretion should be given to the courts in order to be 
able to decide with regard to the given circumstances whether instant court control is needed or 
a procedural ruling which can be contested only in an action for setting aside the award on the 
merits.58  
 
Art. 16 MAL does not deal with the case if the arbitral tribunal finds that it has no jurisdiction 
to hear the case. A previous draft of the MAL contained a relevant provision that ”A ruling by 
the arbitral tribunal that it has no jurisdiction may be contested by any party within 30 days 
before the Court specified in Art.6.”. The aim of the provision was not to force the arbitrators 
to continue the proceedings but to obtain a decision on the existence of a valid arbitration 
agreement. The drafters had the opinion that such an arbitral ruling is final and binding 
concerning these arbitration proceedings but did not answer the question whether the 
substantive claim is to be decided by the state court or the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, as such a 
                                                 
54 Art. 16 (1) MAL 
55 Art. 16 (2) MAL 
56 Art. 16 (3) MAL 
57 In International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) v. Tripal Systems Pty. Ltd. the court held that once the arbitral tribunal had 
declared itself competent, the Superior Court would be competent to review this decision in accordance with Art. 16 (3) MAL, 
if a party requested so. (http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout182.htm) 
58  Analytical commentary on draft text of model law on international commercial arbitration: report of the Secretary-General 
(A/CN.9/264): Article 16, para 13. 
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provision was not incorporated in the MAL, it is up to the national source of law on arbitration 
or civil procedure to determine whether court control can be requested against the decision of 
the arbitral tribunal denying its own jurisdiction59.  
 
 
9. COURT ASSISTANCE IN TAKING EVIDENCE (ART. 27 MAL) 
Significance of the MAL providing for court assistance in taking evidence lies in two main 
aspects. First, before the introduction of the MAL, some national laws did not contain any 
regulation on the issue, i.e. nowadays, it has become a general requirement for the countries to 
implement such rules. Secondly, the MAL creates the frame for a detailed national regulation 
which is, of course, elaborated by the countries themselves with regard to national habits and 
characteristics of civil procedure.  
 
Again, the MAL and the ZPO contain nearly the same wording, while the Hungarian 
Arbitration Act has a little bit different text and structure. According to the MAL and the 
ZPO60, the arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request 
from a competent court of the State assistance in taking evidence. The first important factor is 
that the requesting party must also ask for the approval of the arbitral tribunal which prevents 
dilatory tactics. The second one is that the ‘court’ in this place is not the same as what is 
provided for in Art. 6 MAL (specified in ZPO Art. 37 and Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 53 – 
cf. para 5-6.). Instead, the court on the territory of which the taking of evidence is the most 
expedient. The court may execute the request within its competence and according to its rules 
on taking evidence. A Canadian Court decision dealt with the interpretation of this very 
question and held that a court may assist in taking evidence but “it should avoid taking 
measures conductive to dilatory tactics of the parties”. Since according to the Federal Rules of 
Procedure, the witness whose testimony is sought may have information on an issue in the 
action. This requirement was not met because the issue concerned was already decided upon by 
the arbitrator and the court “was not satisfied that the evidence before it demonstrated that the 
witness had any information”61. 
 
Now, there is one difference between the provisions of the MAL and the ZPO. The latter adds 
to the above rules that court assistance cannot only be requested in taking evidence but also in 
other judicial acts, and that the arbitrators are entitled to participate in any judicial taking of 
evidence and to ask questions.  
 
This is how the Hungarian Arbitration Act comprehends the issue: “if taking evidence caused 
significant hardship or disproportionate rise of costs, the municipal court, by request of the 
arbitral tribunal, provides legal aid in taking evidence and applying coercive instruments 
necessary for the latter”62. This is a slightly different wording compared to that of the MAL and 
ZPO but a more important one is that the Hungarian law provides for measures of protection 
in the same article while the latter two have different articles for interim measures of protection 
and court assistance in taking evidence63.  
                                                 
59 Analytical commentary on draft text of model law on international commercial arbitration: report of the Secretary-General 
(A/CN.9/264): Article 16, para 15. 
60 Art. 27 MAL, ZPO Art. 1050. 
61 Delphi Petroleum Inc. v. Derin Shipping and Training Ltd. - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout068.htm 
62 Art. 37 (3) 
63 Cf. Chapter 3. 
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By examining Art. 9 MAL, the importance of the relationship between Art. 9 and 27 MAL has 
already been mentioned. A court decision explained the core of the question64. In the instant 
case, the court ruled that a subpoena duces tecum does not qualify as an interim measure in the 
meaning of Art. 9 MAL, instead, it is governed by Art. 27 MAL. The court held that the 
subpoena was issued in accordance with Art. 27 MAL and with the approval of the arbitral 
tribunal. Nevertheless, such a subpoena can only be applied for in relation to an evidentiary 
hearing which, in that case, was held months, years before the application. Therefore, the court 
clarified that for court assistance in taking evidence, proper integration into the taking evidence 
by the arbitral tribunal is needed.  
 
 
10. SETTING ASIDE AN ARBITRAL AWARD (ART. 34 MAL) 
The reason why this provision was incorporated into the MAL is that previously several 
national laws had no separate regulation on judicial review of arbitral awards. In many cases the 
same rules applied to them as to normal state court decisions. This was not appropriate because 
the difference of state jurisdiction and arbitration requires different reasons of recourse and 
one of the most essential advantages of arbitration, quick procedure could not be present. MAL 
initiated a separate and individual regulation for arbitral awards where setting aside an arbitral 
award become the only possibility of recourse. The Working Group did not specify what kind 
of awards can be subject to recourse, and , in lack of time, it did not give a definition of  
‘award’.65  
 
Again, this provision is nearly the same in all three legal sources66 except that the Hungarian 
Act also provides that the arbitral award shall not be subject to an appeal, solely setting aside 
the award can be requested. According to the MAL, an arbitral award may be set aside by the 
court specified in article 6 in two main cases: if it is requested by a party or if the court finds 
any of the reasons to do so. The first group includes the following reasons for setting aside: a 
party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity in drafting the arbitration 
agreement; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected 
it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of this State; or the party making the 
application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral 
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or the award deals with a dispute not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains 
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, 
only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration 
may be set aside67; or the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not 
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a 
provision of this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was 
not in accordance with this Law68.  
                                                 
64 Vibroflotation A.G. v. Express Builders Co. Ltd. - http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout077.htm; cf. Chapter 3. 
65  Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its sixth session A/CN.9/246, 129., paras. 
192-194.  
66 Art. 34 (1) MAL, ZPO Art. 1059 (1), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 54.  
67 This latter requirement is not fulfilled if the requesting party refers to its breach by stating that the parties did not agree on 
the form of the award and objects to incoherent and incomprehensible reasons given by the arbitrators. Navigation Sonamar Inc. 
v. Algoma Steamships Limited and others http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout010.htm 
68 Art. 34 (2) a) MAL, ZPO Art. 1059 (2), Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 55 (1)  
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The second group contains the circumstances under which a court by itself may set aside an 
arbitral award, which are: the court finds that the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of this State; or the award is in conflict with the public 
policy of this State69. Definition of public policy is not always easy. In international practice a 
court held that an award is contrary to public policy if it undermines the integrity of 
international commercial arbitration e.g. fraud, corruption, bribery or serious procedural 
irregularities70. In Hungarian practice, the High Court of Hungary expressed that public policy 
does not mean only the most important constitutional values but also political aims and 
conceptions71. 
 
This list of reasons for setting aside an award is exhaustive and cannot be interpreted 
extensively72. Looking further at the reasons for refusing enforcement and recognition of an 
award, nearly the same list can be found, i.e. the MAL and the ZPO mentions exactly the same 
reasons, while the Hungarian law refers only to the last two73. The significance of this lies in the 
fact that the party can choose between requesting the court to set aside or to refuse recognition 
and enforcement of the award. This results the “salutary effect of avoiding ‘split’ or ‘relative’ 
validity of international awards, i.e. awards which are void in the country of origin but valid and 
enforceable abroad”74. A good practical example for this can be found in Art. 1059 (3) ZPO 
which provides that no application for setting aside the award may be made once the award has 
been declared enforceable by a German court.  
 
Looking at the time factor concerning requesting the setting aside of an arbitral award, different 
solutions can be found:  within three months according to the MAL and the ZPO75 and within 
sixty days (term of preclusion) according to the Hungarian Arbitration Act76. These time limits 
can be extended by not more than one month according to the ZPO77 if the request was made 
for correction and interpretation of an award or making an additional award. Art. 34 (3) MAL 
refers to correction, interpretation and additional award but it differs from the regulation by 
the ZPO, because the MAL provides only that the time limit is calculated from the date on 
which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.  
 
                                                 
69 Art. 34 (2) b) MAL and ZPO Art. 1059 (2) 2. are unanimous that these circumstances can only be found by the court, while 
the Art. 55 (2) of the Hungarian Arbitration Act does not mention this. Yet, logically, the two are the same because the court 
examines the case only if the parties requested it to do so and set aside the award only if it (the court) finds that the dispute is 
not subject to arbitration or the award is contrary to public policy. Furthermore, the MAL and the Hungarian Arbitration Act, 
by the last reason for setting aside, mentions that the award is contrary to public policy, while the ZPO provides that recognition 
and enforcement of the award should be contrary to public policy.  
70 Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Commission v. Genius Joel Maposa – The court held that since the arbitrator did not commit any 
moral turpitude, the award cannot be set aside by referring to an alleged conflict with public policy. Harare High Court 
Judgment No. HH23198. 
71 Judgement by the High Court of Hungary No. Gf.VI.30.848/1997/8. 
72 See: D. Frampton & Co. Ltd. v. Sylvio Thibeault and Navigation Harvey & Fréres Inc. - 
http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout012.htm 
73 Art. 36 (1) MAL, New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Art. V., ZPO Art. 
1060, Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 59. 
74 74 Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
commentary to Art. 34, para 13.,  www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm 
75 Art. 34 (3) MAL, ZPO Art. 1059 (3). 
76 Art. 55 (1), (3) 
77 ZPO Art. 1059 (3) 
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Now let us turn to the question of what special effects the request of setting aside the award 
may have. The MAL and the ZPO78 provide for suspension of the setting aside proceedings 
incorporated into the latter79. Suspension is important because it enables the arbitral tribunal 
to reconsider a special aspect of the case without being obliged to make a completely new 
decision. The MAL contains that the court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where 
appropriate and so requested by a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period of 
time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the 
arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal's opinion will 
eliminate the grounds for setting aside. The ZPO simply states that the court, when asked to set 
aside an award, may, where appropriate, set aside the award and remit the case to the arbitral 
tribunal. In practice, the court sets a time-limit for the arbitral tribunal to reconsider the issue 
until which recognition and enforcement of the award are suspended, too and if the arbitral 
tribunal fails to take the appropriate measures, the setting aside procedure is continued. 
Concerning the scope of remission to the arbitral tribunal, a very characteristic decision was 
made in D. Frampton & Co. Ltd. v. Sylvio Thibeault and Navigation Harvey & Fréres Inc. where the 
court held that „the court cannot draw authority from Art. 34 (4) MAL to refer the matter back 
to the arbitral tribunal and request that it reconsider a question which was not originally 
considered by the arbitrators”80.   
 
The two examined national laws contain special provisions in addition to those harmonizing 
with the MAL. The ZPO, for example, lays down that setting aside the arbitral award shall, in 
the absence of any indication to the contrary, result in the arbitration agreement becoming 
operative again in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute81. The Hungarian Arbitration Act 
further explains that complementary rules on the procedure of the state court are those of the 
Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, except that the decision of the court should be subject to 
no appeal but the party may request recourse against a legally binding court decision82.  
 
 
11. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRAL AWARD 
(ART. 35-36 MAL) 
Recognition and enforcement are not unanimously provided for in the MAL, the ZPO and the 
Hungarian Arbitration Act. Therefore, the three sources of law will be analysed separately.  
 
Turning to the MAL, the question is why such a provision was incorporated into the MAL if 
the New York Convention deals with the whole issue separately. The reason is that besides 
already existing bilateral and multilateral treaties, a supplementary network of recognition and 
enforcement was needed in order to provide equal treatment for domestic and international 
awards and to unify domestic legal provisions. Art. 35 contains general rules while Art. 36 
provides for the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement.  
 
An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be recognized as 
binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court, shall be enforced subject to 
                                                 
78 Art. 34 (4) MAL, ZPO Art. 1059 (4).  
79 In common law systems, suspension is a separate procedure. 
80 http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout012.htm 
81 ZPO Art. 1059 (5)  
82 Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 57. 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, issue 2003 #1 
 
 
17 
the latter provisions and those concerning grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement 
(i.e. Art. 36)83. During the course of the recognition/enforcement process, the court cannot 
reconsider the case84. The binding force mentioned in the provision appears between the 
parties from the date of the court decision. In a more general aspects, to achieve the expected 
results, reciprocity is not needed between the country where the award was made and the 
country at the court of which recognition or enforcement is sought. It is very important that the 
provision distinguishes between recognition and enforcement. It is logical that recognition is 
not only the condition of enforcement but also an individual institution.  
 
Art. 35 (2) MAL determines the criteria of submitting a request on recognition or enforcement 
to the court. Accordingly, the party relying on an award or applying for its enforcement shall 
supply the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof, and the original 
arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. If the award or agreement is not made in 
an official language of this State, the party shall supply a duly certified translation thereof into 
such language. This provision, which is the same as Art. IV of the New York Convention, sets 
maximum standards, therefore it would not be contrary to the harmonization to be achieved by 
the model law if a State retained even less onerous conditions85. This also means that no more 
and no stricter rules can be applied by a State, as has been found in Murmansk Trawl Fleet v. 
Bimman Realty Inc. Where the court found that, in order to be enforceable, it was not necessary 
that a foreign award be confirmed under the law of the place where the arbitral award was 
issued. This conclusion was also supported by the fact that public policy favours the avoidance 
of delays once the parties have chosen a way of dispute resolution which is aimed at more 
efficient (and quick) dispute resolution86.  
 
Art. 36 (1) MAL provides that recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of 
the country in which it was made, may be refused only on any of the grounds listed. These 
grounds are the same as those in Art. V of the New York Convention and the grounds for 
setting aside an award (Art. 34 MAL), yet, compared with the latter there is one more ground 
for refusal which can be invoked by the party, i.e. the award has not yet become binding on the 
parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law 
of which, that award was made. Apart from this, all grounds are the same in setting aside and 
refusal of recognition or enforcement in the MAL, thus, the drafters wanted to give the 
possibility to the parties to choose between the two, irrespective of the country in which the 
award was made and is intended to be recognized or enforced.  
 
In order to avoid parallel procedures, Art. 36 (2) provides that if an application for setting aside 
or suspension of an award has been made to a court referred to in the paragraph containing the 
extra ground for refusal87, the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it 
considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming 
recognition or enforcement of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate security. 
Detailed procedural rules are not provided for in the MAL because they depend on those of the 
certain country dealing with the issue.  
 
                                                 
83 Art. 35 (1) MAL 
84 In Robert E. Schreter v. Gasmac Inc., the court followed this opinion and held that the case cannot be re-opened unless serious 
procedural irregularities or conflict with public policy is found. http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout030.htm 
85 Note to Art. 35 (2) MAL 
86  http://www.interarb.com/clout/clout117.htm 
87 Art. 36 (1) a) v. 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, issue 2003 #1 
 
 
18 
Rules of the MAL are not exactly followed by the ZPO and the Hungarian Arbitration Act. The 
ZPO deals with recognition and enforcement of domestic and foreign awards separately. Art. 
1060 (1) ZPO provides that enforcement of a domestic award takes place if it has been declared 
enforceable. Concerning grounds for refusal, Art. 1060 (2) provides that an application for a 
declaration of enforceability shall be refused and the award set aside if one of the grounds for 
setting aside88. Grounds for setting aside shall not be taken into account, if at the time when 
the application for a declaration of enforceability is served, an application for setting aside 
based on such grounds has been finally rejected; also in cases where a party may request setting 
aside or refusal, if the time-limits of application89 have expired without the party opposing the 
application having made an application for setting aside the award. From these provisions it is 
evident that the German regulation emphasizes the connection between the alternatives of 
setting aside and recognition/enforcement of an arbitral award. Therefore, the procedure is 
simpler and dilatory tactics are also avoided because e.g. recognition/enforcement cannot be 
refused if a prior application for setting aside the award was refused on the same grounds.  
 
Rules of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards can be found in Art. 1061 ZPO 
which shall be subject to the provisions of the New York convention and other treaties on the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards shall remain unaffected90. If the declaration of 
enforceability is to be refused, the court shall rule that the arbitral award is not to be recognized 
in Germany91. If the award is set aside abroad after having been declared enforceable, 
application for setting aside the declaration of enforceability may be made92.  
 
The Hungarian Arbitration Act emphasizes that effect of an arbitral award is the same as that of 
a legally binding court judgement and it is to be enforced according to the Act on Court 
Enforcement93.  
 
Enforcement can be refused only in two cases: if the court finds that the dispute is not subject 
to arbitration according to Hungarian law, or if the award is contrary to the Hungarian public 
policy94. These possibilities are consonant to the second group of grounds for setting aside or 
refusal in the MAL. Although not all questions are explicitly settled by the Act, the Hungarian 
Code of Civil Procedure is not a background source of law in all cases, only if the parties agreed 
to its application or if the arbitral tribunal having the right to decide upon its procedure admits 
to it. The ‘real’ supplementary source of law to the Hungarian Arbitration Act is the New York 
Convention95 according to which grounds for refusal of recognition/enforcement are the same 
as those of setting aside an award.  
 
The Hungarian Act uses provisions similar to the German regulation. Hence, recognition and 
enforcement are to be refused if the award was set aside by the court; if no setting aside 
proceedings were initiated but the court finds that the subject-matter f the dispute is not 
capable of arbitration or the award is contrary to public policy. Official commentary to the Act 
                                                 
88 ZPO Art. 1059 (2) 
89 ZPO Art. 1059 (3) 
90 ZPO Art. 1061 (1) 
91 ZPO Art. 1061 (2) 
92 ZPO Art. 1061 (3) 
93 Act of Parliament No. 53 of 1994, as provided by the Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 58. 
94 Hungarian Arbitration Act Art. 59. 
95 Enacted by 1962. évi 25. tvr. Hungary made a reservation to the Convention the application of which it allows only in 
connection with recognition and enforcement of awards made in any other Contracting State and deriving from legal 
relationships which are qualified as commercial according to Hungarian law.  
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explains that ”this is necessary because by those two grounds legal interest if the state is that the 
award be not enforceable, therefore, refusal of enforcement does not depend only on whether 
the party requested refusal of enforcement. It is also possible that the arbitral award was made 
before the court decision on the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and enforcement of 
the arbitral award. The court is not obliged to enforce this award, not even when the other 
party did not request setting aside, because a court decision affirming its own jurisdiction binds 
all parties (this is suggested by public policy)96.  
 
Art. 60 of the Hungarian Arbitration Act harmonizes with Art. 35  (2) MAL in providing that 
“the party referring to or requesting enforcement of an arbitral award shall supply the duly 
authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof (thus, the award shall not be put 
into court deposit); and  if the award is in a language other than Hungarian, a duly certified 
translation is to be supplied.  
 
Summarizing the analysed provisions we can contend that these national provisions are those 
which were mentioned before, i.e. which fill in the framework of the MAL with specific 
domestic rules harmonizing with the civil procedure regulation of that certain country.  
 
 
SUMMARY 
It is a saluted fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
has been adopted by numerous countries of the world. In order to ensure further unification 
and effectuation of arbitral proceedings, even more countries should follow its exemplary 
provisions. Implementation of the MAL into national laws and its completion with domestic 
legal features enable developed countries to own an up-to-date arbitration regulation. Taking 
over this example might help developing countries to create their own rules and integrate their 
legal regulation into a globalizing system of arbitration.  
 
German and Hungarian law have fulfilled the latter requirement, as proven in this comparative 
analysis. Unification of the rules of arbitration is being realized at a high level but, of course, 
with regard to unique legal characteristics of each country, full unification cannot be 
effectuated.  
 
In globalizing economy, advantageous features of arbitration may be strengthened by 
unification because if the different arbitration rules of different countries have the same core, 
participants of an international arbitration procedure shall not have to face unknown legal 
provisions and cross-border boundaries of arbitration can easily be eliminated. The model law 
provides for protective procedural measures, therefore, international commercial arbitration 
cannot be hindered by the countries who wish to protect their own interests by sticking to their 
own rules of procedure. Hopefully, more and more countries will decide to adopt the model 
regulation in order to ensure a more global system of international commercial arbitration.   
 
                                                 
96 Commentary to the Hungarian Arbitration Act, Commentary to Art. 58-60. 
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